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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Coverdell Educational SavingsAccounts and 529 savingplans are mar-
keted as attractive vehiclesfor college savings. Themain finding of this
paper is that collegesavings plans can actuallyharm some families. The
joint treatment by the incometax code and financialaid system of col-
lege savings creates tax ratesthat exceed 100 percent forthose families
on the marginof receiving additionalfinancial aid. Because even fami-
lies with incomes above$100,000 receive need-basedaid, the impact of
these very high taxes isquite broad. I find that anaid-marginal family
with funds in a Coverdellis worse off than if itdid not save at all.
Simulations show that $1,000of pretax income placed in aCoverdell for
a newbornand left to accumulate untilcollege will face incomeand aid
taxes that consumeall of the principal, all ofthe earnings, and an addi-
tional several hundreddollars. This perverse outcomeis the product of
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poor coordination between the incometax code and the financial aid
system.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years,a new breed of tax-advantaged savingsvehicle has emerged. The federal CoverdellEducation Savings Account (ESA)allows annual, after-tax deposits ofup to $2,000 a year, with asset earnings
untaxed as long as withdrawalsare used for educational expenses. At the
state level, nearly every state offersa tax-advantaged 529 savings plan.
These accounts allow participantsto make annual, after-tax depositsof up to $11,000 a year per child,comparable to the annual ceilingson the
401(k).1 The tax treatment is likethat of the ESA: earningsare untaxed by the federal government, andby almost every state, whenthe funds are used for postsecondary education.In about half the states, depositsare exempt from state taxation, further increasingthe income tax advantages
of the 529.
Politicians and financial advisersaggressively market 529 saving plans
and the ESA as attractive vehiclesfor college savings. Formany families, the favorable tax treatmentof these savings vehicles doesmake them
more attractive than other methods ofsaving for college. As I show inthis paper, however, some familiesare worse off saving in an ESA than they
would be in an alternative savingsvehicle, such as an IRAor even a
non-tax-advantaged account. For familieson the margin of getting more
financial aid, holding fundsin an education savingsaccount results in
substantial decreases in aid eligibility.In the case of the ESA,more than a dollar in aid is lost for each dollarheld in the account,more than undoing
its tax incentive for saving andin fact leaving a familyworse off than if it had not saved at all.
One might dismiss the results ofthe paper as irrelevant byobserving that the poor get aid but donot save, and the richsave but do not get aid.
This common wisdom iswrong. As I show in the next section,a substan-
tial proportion of families withincomes above $70,000, andeven $100,000,
receive need-based aid in the formof both grants and loans.Upper- income students at expensive,four-year private collegesoften qualify for need-based grant aid fromtheir schools, whileeven those at less-
expensive four-year public colleges oftenqualify for subsidized,need-based
1Each parent can deposit $11,000per child in a given year without triggeringa gift tax. A two-parent family with three children couldtherefore move $66,000per year into a tax- advantaged 529 account. Grandparentscan also make deposits up to these limits, further expanding the amount of assets thatcan be shielded from taxation. A five-yearaveraging option allows a participant to contribute $55,000in a single year without triggeringa gift tax.Tax Policy and EducationPolicy83
federal loans. These families aretherefore subject to the aid policiesI
describe in the paper. Of course,such families also save and sohave assets
that are affected by theintersection of tax policy and aidpolicy described
in this paper.
The fact that a tension existsbetween policies intended toincrease sav-
ing and distributeaid according to need isunsurprising. The intent of the
529 and ESA is to increasesaving by increasingafter-tax returns. The
intent of the need-basedaid system is to give lessaid to those with greater
assets. These two setsof policies inevitablywork at cross-purposes
because the aid system taxes awaypart of the increase in assetsand asset
returns that the savingsincentives create.2 This tensionbetween targeting
funds to those who are mostneedy and discouraging desirablebehaviors
is an inherentcharacteristic of all means-tested programs.For example,
the old welfare systemhad an earned income test:welfare benefits were
reduced proportionally for eachdollar earned. This acted as a tax onlabor
supply and theoreticallydiscouraged work effort bywelfare recipients.
Similarly, the need-based aid systemtaxes increases in incomeand assets,
thereby potentially discouragingsaving.
Unless assets and asset income arecompletely disregarded in the dis-
tribution of need-basedaid, the aid determination processinevitably
reduces asset returnsand perhaps saving rates. Theconclusion of this
paper is that thetension between targetingaid and discouraging saving
can bemanaged well or poorly. Forexample, I find that the aid system
assesses different assetsat highly variable rates,with the drop in aid asso-
ciated with a dollar in assetsranging from 0.50 to nearly$2.00. This vari-
ation in asset treatmenthas a cost because it distortsdecisions about
the composition of savings.There is no concomitantbenefit, however,
because these wildly varyingpolicies do not improve thetargeting of aid
toward needy students. Ifanything, such arbitrary policyvariation
undermines the goals ofneed-based aid because familieswith identical
financial positions receive verydifferent levels of aid,depending on
whether they are savvyenough to steer their savingstoward the right
vehicles.
It now appears that theDepartment of Education ismoving to improve
the treatment of the ESAdocumented in this paper. In earlyNovember
2003, the departmentposted revisions to the onlineversion of the Student
Financial Aid Handbook, its referencemanual of aid rules. These revisions
indicate that, in the future,the ESA will be given thetreatment currently
applied to the 529 savingsplans. This treatment willeliminate the so-
called aid tax of over 100 percentthat is currently applied tothe ESA.
2The aid tax was first discussed byEdlin (1993) and Feldstein (1995).84Dynarski
It is not clear when thisnew policy will become effective. Given how
the department collects asset datafrom applicants,a necessary step in
implementing the new policy isrevision of the Free Applicationfor
Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). TheFAFSA does not collectseparate data
on each type of asset; if it did, the departmentcould change the formula
that calculates aid eligibility withoutaltering the FAFSA. Rather, the
2003-2004 FAFSA, which hasnot been revised, instructs familiesto add
ESA balances to other miscellaneousstudent assets, while 529 balancesare added to other parental assets. Parentaland student assetsare then run
separately through the aid formula, with$1.00 in student assets leadingto a reduction in aid of more than $1.00over the course of a college career.
Note that all student assetsare subject to this treatment; changing the
treatment of the ESA will still leave otherstudent assets subject to thevery
high taxes, that are the subject ofthis paper. The discussion insection 6 addresses this point.
The paper is organizedas follows. In section 2, I show that families
quite high in the income distributionare affected by aid policy. In section
3, I provide backgroundon the tax-advantaged college savings plans.
I calculate returns on varioussavings vehicles net of incometaxes in sec-
tion 4. In section 5, I explain theaid determinationprocess and calculate
returns that account for both incometaxes and the reductions in aid
caused by holding savings invarious vehicles. Section 6 discussesthe results, and section 7 concludes.
2. WHO IS AFFECTED BYAID POLICY?
What kind of family is affectedby the aid system and itstreatment of
assets? Given the historically high levelof tuition prices, relatively well-
off families qualify for need-basedaid and so are affected by the aidrules. This scenario is particularlytrue if the student attendsa private college or
if a family has multiple studentsin college at the same time.3 As thissec- tion will show, families all alongthe income distributionare affected by
the need-based aid system andits treatment of assets andasset returns.
For two kinds of families, however,the aid system's treatment ofassets
is irrelevant. The first type of familyis extremely needy (as definedby the
need-based aid system) and receivesthe maximum aid allowed.4 Forthis family, a marginal decrease inassets does not increase its aid,nor does
a marginal increase in its assets decrease its aid.Because no link exists
A family that has multiple children in collegeat a given point in time is eligible formore need-based aid than if those children attendedcollege in sequence.
Total aid is capped by a student's actualschooling costs, which includes tuitionand fees plus an allowance for items suchas food, rent, and other living expenses.Tax Policy and Education Policy85
between assets and aid for thisfamily, its net asset returns areunaffected
by the aid system. The second typeof family is at the other end of the spec-
trum: this family is well off(again, as defined by the need-basedaid system)
and receives no aid. Marginal changesin assets do not affect this family'said
eligibifity For any family that is not at oneof these two extremes of need,
asset returns are affected bythe rules discussed in this paper.
2.1 Who Gets Aid?
Families all along the incomedistribution get financial aid. Table 1shows
the probability that a studentwith a given family income will receive
need-based aid. The table also showsthe average amount of aidreceived
among aid recipients.These data are for nonforeign, full-time,dependent
TABLE 1
Need-Based Aid Receipt, by Income, forDependent, Full-Time
Undergraduates, Academic Year 1999-2000
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undergraduates attending a single college inacademic year 1999-2000
and are taken from the 2000 National PostsecondaryAid Survey (NPSAS).
I show results separately for fourcategories of need-based aid: (1) all
types, including grants, loans, and work study;(2) federal Pell Grants
only; (3) need-based grants provided bycolleges; and (4) subsidized
federal loans.
Low-income families are most likely toreceive aid and get the largest
aid packages.5 Among students with familyincomes below $40,000,
85 percent receive need-based aid, with theirtotal aid packages averaging
$6,859. However, middle- andeven upper-income families are quite likely
to receive substantial amounts of aid. Of studentsfrom families with
incomes of $40,000 to $70,000, 62 percentreceive need-based aid in the
form of grants, loans, or work study, with theaid of recipients averaging
$5,937. Moving up the income distribution,we see that 37 percent of stu-
dents from families with incomes of $70,000to $100,000 receive need-
based aid averaging $5,371. Even in the highestincome group, 22 percent
of students receive some form of need-basedaid, averaging $4,975.
The composition of this need-based aidvaries considerably across the
income groups. Pell Grant distribution is highlyprogressive. While 68 per-
cent of students from families with income below$40,000 receive a Pell
Grant, only 9 percent of students from familieswith incomes of $40,000 to
$70,000 receive a Pell Grant, andno students in higher income categories
receive one. While the Fell Grant is heavilyconcentrated among low-
income students, the story is quite differentfor other forms of need-based
aid. Colleges and universities, especiallythe more expensive private
schools, distribute their own need-based scholarships.The more expensive
the school, the more likely thata student of a given income level wifi qual-
ify for need-based aid from that school.Among students with family
income below $40,000, 26 percent receiveneed-based grants from their
schools, with the grant of recipientsaveraging $4,074. In the next higher
income category the share receivinga need-based grant drops barely, to 24
percent, while the average grant received risesto $5,060. This reflects the
tendency of these higher-income familiesto send their children to expen-
sive schools. Even among families with incomesabove $100,000, 12 percent
receive need-based grants from their schoolsaveraging $4,617 per grant.6
Note that the average amount of need-based aid doesnot drop very rapidly with income.
This situation arises because higher-income studentsare more likely to attend expensive pri-
vate institutions, and need is a function of both ability topay and actual schooling costs.
6Most schools follow the federal formulas described in thispaper in distributing their own
need-based grant. Eighty-seven percent of four-yearpublic schools and 57 percent of four-
year private schools use the federal formula in distributing theirown need-based grants (see
National Association of Student Financial Aid Administratorsand the College Board, 2002).Tax Policy and Education Policy87
Many middle- and upper-incomestudents also qualify for need-based,
subsidized federal loans. While loans areobviously less valuable than
grants, the need-basedPerkins and Stafford loans have veryattractive
terms, with all interestpaid while the child is in schooland a low rate of
interest paid thereafter. Thesubsidy value of a need-basedStafford loan
is currently about 30 cents onthe dollar.7 In the $40,000 to$70,000 income
range, 49 percentof students receive one of thesefederal loans, with
annual borrowing averaging $3,419,not very different from the borrow-
ing patterns in the lowest-incomegroup (52 percentborrowing, with
loans averaging $3,835). Evenin the highest income category,the figures
are 12 percent and$3,518, respectively.
2.2 Who Is on the Marginof Getting More Aid?
Many of the families whoreceive need-based aid are on themargin of get-
ting more aidthat is, anincrease (decrease) in theirfinancial resources
decreases (increases) the amountof aid for which they are eligible. So too
are those familieswho currently get no aid at allbut would if their finan-
cial resources, as defined bythe aid system, were to decrease.We can
learn how many students are onthe aid margin by examiningthe popu-
lation of current students,and in particular those who applyfor financial
aid. Note that who appliesfor aid is almost certainlyinfluenced by indi-
viduals' expectations about whetherthey will qualify for aid and how
much they might receive. Forexample, an upper-income familywith sub-
stantial funds in an ESA might notapply for aid under the currentpolicy
regime, but that same familywould if the aid system treatedESAs differ-
ently. By using data fromthose students who apply for aid toestimate the
share of all students who are onthe margin of aid, I underestimatethe
share of the student populationthat would be affected by a changein
the aid formula because Ido not account for such endogenouschanges in
the extensive aid margin.8
Describing who is on the aid marginrequires some understanding of
how the need-based aid systemdefines need. As I will describe in greater
detail later in the paper, need isdetermined by comparing a student's pro-
jected schooling costs with theamount that the aid formuladetermines
See my previous work in Dynarski,2002. The bulk of the subsidy arises fromthe govern-
ment paying the interest on theloan while the student is in school. Thesubsidy value on the
Stafford is at a historical low because marketinterest rates are quite low. As marketinterest
rates rise, so too does thesubsidy value. The subsidy value risesespecially rapidly when
market rates exceed the statutory rate capof 8.25 percent because above this rate,the gov-
ernment assumes all interest rate risk.
8Note that in the following calculations,when a student does not have EFC information, as
is the case for anyone who has notapplied for aid, I have assumed that she orhe is not on
the margin of getting aid.88Dynarski
that her or his family can affordto pay toward college. This latteramount
is referred to as the expected familycontribution (EFC). Need is defined
as schooling costs minus the EFC.
Two types of students areon the aid margin: (1) those receivingno aid
but who would if their financial situationchanged marginally (these stu-
dents have nonpositive need) and (2)those receiving some aid who
would receive more or less aid if theirfinancial situation changedmar-
ginally (these students have positiveneed). I treat these two cases in turn.
A student with nonpositive needis not eligible for need-based aid
because the aid formula calculates thathe and his family can handle the
full cost of college. Those withvery negative need (EFC >> schooling cost)
are far from the aid margin because the aid formulaindicates that they
can contribute an amount well above schoolingcosts; such families are
not on the aid margin. But for those whoseneed is relatively small and
negative, marginal decreases in their financialresources push them over
the margin into aid eligibility
At the bottom of Table 1, I show the shareof students in each income
category whose need lies between 0 and$5,000. For these students,
changing the formula so that theirexpected family contribution drops by
$5,000 or less pushes themover the margin into receiving aid. Toget a
sense of the magnitude of this change in EFC,note that a high school sen-
ior whose family has $15,000 of collegesavings in a Coverdell ESAor
Uniform Transfer to Minors Act (UTMA)account has a freshman-year
EFC about $5,000 higher thana senior whose family has no collegesav-
ings.9 The lowest-income families (lessthan $40,000) are always eligible
for some form of need-based aid,so none of them are on this aid mar-
gin. However, 6 percent of students fromfamilies in the $40,000 to
$70,000 income range, and 14percent of those in the $70,000 to $100,000
income range, would be pushed into aideligibility by a decrease in their
EFC of $5,000 or less. In the highest-incomegroup, 8 percent are on this
aid margin.'0
Another type of family is gettingsome need-based aid but would get
more if their EFC dropped. These families have positiveneed, but they are
not so needy that changes in their financialsituation cannot increaseor
decrease their aid package. I define these familiesas those whose EFCs are
sufficiently far from zero (at least $5,000)that they will see substantial
changes in need if their financialresources (as defined by the aid system)
As I will show later in the paper, the aid eligibilityof subsequent years of college is also
negatively affected by this ESA account,so the ultimate impact of ESA and UTMA holdings
on aid is substantially larger than that described in thissentence.
° Note that the shareof students on this margin is likely to beunderestimated using data on aid applicants, as discussed above.Tax Policy and EducationPolicy89
alter. For such families,dollar decreases in needtranslate into dollar
increases in aid. Forexample, their need can increaseby at least $5,000
without bumping up againstthe ceiling of the student'stotal schooling
costs.11 Again, few low-incomestudents are on this aidmarginjust 4
percent. However, about40 percent of students inthe $40,000 to $100,000
income group have roomfor their need to grow by atleast $5,000; 19 per-
cent of students in the topincome group fall on thisaid margin.
As the bottom row ofTable 1 shows, a substantialshare of families fall
on one of these twoaid margins. Roughly halfof students from families
with income between $40,000and $100,000 are on the marginof getting
more aid, as areone-quarter of those fromfamilies with incomes above
$100,000. The interaction ofaid policy and tax policydescribed in this
paper thereforeaffects a large number offamilies.
3. INCOME TAXINCENTIVES FOR COLLEGE
SAVING
3.1 Legislative History
In 1997, the EducationIRA was established. TheEducation IRA was struc-
tured much like the then-newRoth IRA. In both types ofvehicles, after-
tax dollars growtax-free. Earnings are nevertaxed if Education IRA
withdrawals are used forpostsecondary expenses or ifRoth funds are
withdrawn after age 59w.Annual contributions to theEducation IRA were
capped at $500 per childuntil 2001, when the contributionlimit was
raised to $2,000. The same year,eligible educational expenses were
expanded to include primaryand secondary education,and the name of
the Education IRA waschanged to Coverdell EducationSavings Account
(ESA).
While the ESA is a productof federal legislation, the 529savings plans
are innovationsof the states. The 529 savingsplans have their roots in pre-
paid tuition plans, the firstof which was introducedby Michigan in 1986.
Those who purchased sharesin Michigan's plan wereguaranteed that
their investment would coverthe cost of a certain numberof semesters at
Michigan schools. Essentially,Michigan created a savingsplan whose rate
of return was linked totuition costs at the state'spublic postsecondary
schools, thereby allowingparents to insure againstthe risk of rising
tuition prices:'2 Michiganexempted investment returns inits prepaid
This assumes that all need is metby some combination of loans, grants,and work study
provided by government and schools.
12A key drawback of theprepaid plans is that the tuition guaranteeis only for in-state
schools. Funds can be used atout-of-state schools, but the implied rateof return on funds
used in this way is quite low.90Dynarski
plan from state taxes, and thestate argued to the Internal RevenueService (IRS) that returns should also beexempted from federal taxes. TheIRS disagreed, but Michiganwent forward with the plan and suedthe IRS for a refund of taxes paid, winning itscase in 1994. While the Michigancase was wending through the courts,several other states introducedtheir own prepaid tuition plans.
In 1997, Congress codifiedin Internal Revenue Code (IRC),section 529, the federal tax treatment ofthe tuition plans, whichwas to tax earnings in
these accounts only atwithdrawal. IRC 529 also containslanguage that recognized a variant on the prepaidplans that had been introducedby a handful of states: thetax-advantaged college savings plan.Like the Education IRA, thesenew savings plans allowed after-taxinvestments to
grow free of federal and state taxes; however,withdrawals used for post-
secondary costs were exempt onlyfrom state taxation.
With the passage of tax reform in2001, the federal taxon withdrawals from 529 savings planswas eliminated.13 Every state exceptWashington now has a 529 savings plan,as does the District of Columbia. Thegrowth of the 529 savings plans hasfar outstripped that of theprepaid plans likely because of theirgreater fungibility and potentially higherreturns.14 In this paper, I focuson the 529 savings plans.
3.2 Eligibility for and TaxAdvantages of the 529 and ESA
The tax treatments of the ESA and529 are quite sinni...after-taxdollars put into savings and earningsare not taxed as they accrue, norare they taxed
at withdrawal if the withdrawal isused for educational expenses.'5There are some key differences, however, betweenthe two savings vehicles.
First, there is an income limiton participation in the ESA. Joint-filer
households with incomes above$220,000 and single-filerhouseholds with incomes above $110,000cannot contribute to an ESA; eligibility
begins to phase out at $190,000and $95,000, respectively.There is no income limit on contributionsto a 529 savings plan.16
A second distinguishingcharacteristic of the 529 is that itscontribution limits are much higher than thelimit on the ESA. Eachaccount owner (a
13 This federaltax treatment of the 529 savings planssunsets in 2010. The present analysis
assumes that the provision wifi be extended indefinitely.
14 The bullmarket of the 1990s made the tuitionplans appear stodgy to investorsaccus- tomed to double-digit returns. Also, theplans substantially constrained the collegechoices of beneficiaries, who coulduse the funds at out-of-state schools onlyat unattractive terms.
15 As discussedbelow, some states exemptcontributions to the 529 from state taxable
income, thereby increasing the tax advantages.
16 Insome states, the exclusion of contributions fromstate taxable income phases outas income rises. The exclusion of earnings fromtaxable income is not linked to income inany state.Tax Policy and EducationPolicy91
parent or grandparent1for example) can put $11,000in after-tax income
per beneficiary, peryear, into a529.17 A two-parent family with threechil-
dren can put $66,000 a yearinto 529 savings plans fortheir children, but
just $6,000 into ESAs.Each state has a lifetime limit onthe account balance
that can be reached in anaccount held in a givenbeneficiary's name.
When the account reachesthis limit, no additionalcontributions can be
made. The limit averages$241,000, and it ranges from$182,000 in
Louisiana to $305,000 inSouth Dakota.18
Third, while families can investtheir ESAs as they wish,they are con-
strained in their ability toallocate assets in a 529. Eachstate determines
the investment options opento investors in itsplan, and by federal law,
assets can be reallocatedby the investor only once a year.Until recently,
most 529 savings plansprovided only a single investmentoption, an age-
based portfolio that grewless aggressive as the childneared college age.
Most plans now offerseveral investment options.
Finally, the 529s are creaturesof state governments witheach state
sponsoring its own plan.Therefore, heterogeneity in 529characteristics,
including portfolio choice, taxtreatment, and net returns,exists across
the states. Each state contractswith a mutual fund company to runits
plan, chooses themutual funds that will beavailable to investors,
decides on the treatmentof deposits and earningsfor the purposes of
state taxation, andnegotiates fees that will bepaid by the investor to the
state and fund company.Individuals are free to participatein any state's
plan. Many of the states encouragetheir residents to invest inthe local
plan by allowing them todeduct contributions to its529 savings plan
from state taxable income.Some states also taxwithdrawals from other
states' 529 plans, furtherencouraging investors to choosetheir home
state's plan.
There is considerablecross-state variation in feescharged on the 529
accounts. Fees for 529accounts also appear tobe somewhat higher, on
average, than fees onESAs or retail mutualfunds. For the purposes of this
paper, I ignore this sourceof variation in net returns acrossstates and sav-
ings vehicles. Byassuming that pretax returns onthe various savings
vehicles are identical, I canfocus on variation in returnsdriven by the
income tax code and thefinancial aid system. In ongoingwork, I explic-
itly focus on sources ofcross-state heterogeneity in529 returns and its
impact on savingsdecisions.
17A total of $55,000 per accountowner, per year, can bedeposited in a single year for a
beneficiary if no deposits are madefor the next four years.
8See Cerulli Associates, 2003.92Dynarski
4. CALCULATION OFAFTER-TAX RETURNS ON
THE ESA, 529, ANDALTERNATIVE SAVINGS
VEHICLES
In this section, I calculatereturns, net of the income tax,on the 529 and
ESA, in absolute terms and relativeto other vehicles. First, I showvaria- tion in net returnsacross vehicles for a single householdtype, with household income of $100,000and two dependent children.Because the benefits of tax-advantagedaccounts vary with marginal taxrates, I then calculate returns fora range of household incomes.
4.1 Assumptions
For the purposes of assigningtax rates, I consider a householdthat consists of a married couple, filing jointly,with two dependent children. Allearned income is assumed tocome from one earner.19 The childrenare assumed to have no income other than thatproduced by any college savingsheld in their name. The marginal federaland state tax rateson earned income,
capital gains, and interest forthis household, as wellas for the other
income groups I will be analyzing,are shown in Table 2. The state taxrates in Table 2 are the average of thestates' 2002 marginal taxrates for each income group, as calculated bythe TAXSIM program fromthe National
Bureau of Economic Research.2°
Table 2 shows (and thepaper's calculations use) federaltax rates effec- tive as of the Jobs and GrowthTax Relief Reconciliation Act(JGTRRA) of 2003. Some of these ratesare scheduled to revert to pre-2003rates in a few years. It is difficult to forecast which, ifany, of these provisions will be
allowed to sunset,so I calculate the effect of making thecurrent provi- sions permanent in thispaper.
For each savings vehicle,I calculate the returnto $1,000 of pretax
income placed in an accountat the time of a child's birth. A familysaving for college will likelystart with a portfolio heavilyweighted toward stocks and move towarda more conservative mixas the start of college
nears. Every state's 529 savings plan offersan age-based portfolio that fol- lows this pattern. Iuse a portfolio mix typical of state 529sin calculating
returns; this portfolio is shown inTable 3. I assumean identical portfolio
Some assumption about the distributionof earned income within the householdmust be made before FICA rates can be assigned.For each earner, the PICA rate is 7.65percent up to $87,000 and 1.45 percent thereafter.
20 Theaverage is taken over the states that havean income tax. I use effective marginalstate tax rates calculated by TAXSIM ratherthan the bracket rates. The effectivemarginal rates account for the interaction of state and federaltaxes as well as the phaseout of variouscred- its and deductions.Tax Policy and Education Policy93
TABLE 2
Marginal Tax Rates Used inCalculations
Notes: Federal rates are 2003 bracket rates.State rates are average of effective 2002marginal rates calcu-
lated by NBER TA)(SIM (Feenberg andCoutts, 1993 and NBER, 2004). State averages aretaken across
states that have an income tax.
TABLE 3
Age-Based Portfolio Used in ReturnCalculations
Note: Values reflect typicalage-based 529 portfolio.
mix for the other savingsvehicles, so that any variation in returns across
the vehicles will be induced byvariation in their treatment bythe income
tax and financial aid systems.
Stocks are assumed to earn anominal rate of return of 9 percentand
bonds to earn a rate of 4 percent.To simplify the analysis, I assumethat
all stock returns take the formof long-term capital gains.Capital gains are
realized when the funds arewithdrawn from the account to payfor col-
lege; these withdrawals begin atthe end of the account'seighteenth
year.21 After any relevant taxes onasset earnings are paid,earnings are
reinvested.
In about half the states, deposits tothe 529 are excluded from statetax-
able income. I calculate returnsfor 529s both with andwithout this
upfront deduction. I alsocalculate returns for anon-tax-advantaged
mutual fund account in the nameof the parent, a UniformTransfer to
Minors Act (UTMA) accountin the name of the student,and a traditional
21The family withdraws 1/nthof the remaining balance each year,with n representing the
number of years remaining untilcollege completion. For thecalculations in the paper,
I assume four years of college.
Household
income
Earned income Capital gains Interest income










































































IRA. Table 4 summarizes the incometax treatment of these savings vehi-
cles. For all vehicles, Iassume that all capital gains realizationsare put off until the account is drawn downand that no dividendsare earned.
Therefore, the only relevanttaxes on the inside buildupare those on bond
interest.22 Note that the IRAscan be used for higher educationexpenses
without the 10 percent penalty usuallyassessed on withdrawals before
retirement age. However, the earningsportion of such early withdrawals
from a Roth is subject to taxationas ordinary income. As a result, the Roth
is not an advantageous vehicle forcollege savings if its use requires early
withdrawal.
4.2 Calculation of Returns Net ofIncome Taxes: Example
First, I calculate the nominalreturns for a family with householdincome of $100,000, using theassumptions laid out above. The return fora non-
advantaged mutual fundaccount, held in the name of theparent, forms
the benchmark used togauge the financial benefits of the tax-advantaged
vehicles.
After paying social security andMedicare taxes (FICA),as well as fed-
eral and state income taxes,on $1,000 of pretax income, this household
has $673 to deposit. The familyuses the portfolio allocation shown in
Table 3, putting 90 percent of thefunds into stocks and the balanceinto bonds. Interest on the bonds istaxed as ordinary income; the interestnet of taxes is reinvested in theaccount. After 18 years, the account will
have grown to $1,135, with 55percent of the account's value consisting
of unrealized capital gains. Atthe end of year 18,one-quarter of the
account balance is withdrawn topay for college. Capital gains taxes
are paid on the portion of this withdrawalthat represents unrealized
capital gains. After fouryears of withdrawals, the account isempty.
Accounting for income and payrolltaxes, as well as taxes on interest and
capital gains, a family following theinvestment path just describednets
$1,113 on its $1,000 in pretax saving,as shown in Table 5 and in the first
bar in Figure 1.
The tax-advantaged vehicles,including the 529 and ESA,increase
returns by reducing or eliminating thetaxes assessed before the initial
deposit, during the inside buildup,and/or at withdrawal. Thereturn for
each of these vehicles is shown inFigure 1. The second column ofTable 5 shows the returns on assets heldin these vehicles relative toreturns for a
nonadvantaged account in thename of the parent. I briefly discuss the tax
advantages conferred by each of thesevehicles below.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































After-Tax Return to College SavingsAlternatives





$35K $1,735 1.00 $50K 1,485 1.00 $100K 1,113 1.00 $150K 987 1.00 $200K 803 1.00 $335K+
UTMA
728 1.00
$35K $1,824 1.05 $50K 1,618 1.09 $100I( 1,453 1.31 $150K 1,338 1.36 $200K 1,157 1.44 $335K+
529 plan (deduction)
1,084 1.49
$35K $2,188 1.26 $50K 1,976 1.33 $100IK 1,811 1.63 $150K 1,683 1.71 $200K 1,475 1.84 $335K+
529 plan (no deduction)
1,391 1.91
$35K $2,026 1.17 $50K 1,808 1.22 $100K 1,634 1.47 $150K 1,511 1.53 $200K 1,317 1.64 $335K+
ESA
1,238 1.70
$35K $2,026 1.17 $50K 1,808 1.22 $100K 1,634 1.47 $150K 1,511 1.53 $200K 1,317 1.64 $335K+
Traditional IRA
1,238 1.70
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529 plan (n,dndnOlinnl lISA TnadiAonal IRA 529 plan (dndnolinn)
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FIGURE 1. After-Tax Return toCollege Savings Options(Nominal
Return to $1,000 of PretaxSavings, Household Taxable Incomeof
$100,000)
Notes: Assumes the portfolio mixof Table 3, with stock returns of 9percent and bond returns of 4 per-
cent. One-time investment of$1,000 of pretax income with all earningsreinvested. Funds are drawn
down over the final four yearsof the investment horizon.
The UTMA account shifts assetsinto the child's nameand, thereby, the
child's lower tax bracket.23The initial pretax savings aretaxed at the par-
ent's rate, and so$673is deposited into theUTMA, as was true for the
parental account discussedabove. For a family withtaxable income of
$100,000, these tax advantagestranslate into a substantiallyhigher return
on the UTMAaccount rather than on aparental account. This family
yields$1,453in an UTMA accountnearly one-third more than in a
parental account.
A529savings account confers evengreater tax advantagesthan the
UTMA because the taxes onthe inside buildup andwithdrawals are not
just reduced; they areeliminated. In a state that does notallow families
to deduct529deposits from taxable income,$1,000 of pretax income
translates into the same$673deposit that was placed inthe parental
account and UTMA account.Because no taxes are leviedagainst the inside
23In an UTMA, annual assetearnings up to $750 are untaxed. For achild younger than 14,
the next $750 is taxed at thechild's rate and the remainingearnings are taxed at the parents'
rate. For children 14 and over,all earnings over $750 are taxed atthe child's rate. Note that
the tax advantages of the UTMAdrop as asset holdings (andearnings) grow because an
ever-smaller share of earnings aretaxed at a zero rate.
OITMA 70,,,.dna,l,0nd a7C,nl.98Dynarski
buildup, by the time the childenters college, the family hasa slightly higher balance in a 529 than itwould in a parentalaccount or UTMA
($2,314 as compared to $2,135 and$2,277, respectively). The relative
advantage of the 529grows as the family begins to draw down thefunds and is exempted fromany taxes on the resulting capital gainsrealizations. Accounting for these taxes, thefamily nets a $1,634 returnon its $1,000 in pretax savings, 47 percentmore than in a parental account and 12percent
more than with an UTMA. The ESA confersthe same tax advantagesas the 529 without an upfront deductionand therefore yields thesame return.24
The return on these two collegesavings vehicles is also identicalto that
on the traditional IRA. The traditional IRAis the mirror image of the col-
lege savings account becausethere are no upfront taxeson the $1,000 deposit and no taxeson the inside buildup, but withdrawalsare taxed as ordinary income. Note thatthere is no penalty for earlywithdrawal (before age 594) from the traditionalIRA if the fundsare used for higher
education expenses. Thetraditional IRA therefore yields thesame return as the ESA and 529, producinga return 47 percent greater thana nonad- vantaged parental account.
The option with the highestreturn is a 529 in a state that allowsde- posits to be deducted from state taxableincome. For a given $1,000in
pretax income, more can be depositedinto this account than is true fora nondeductible 529 or ESA. With thetypical state tax rateon earned income of 5.95 percent, the initialdeposit is $718 rather than the$673. Going forward, the tax treatment isthe same as for a standard 529or ESA. The 529 with an upfront deductionyields a return of $1,811,or 63 percent
more than a nonadvantaged account in theparent's name.
As these calculations make clear,the education savingsaccounts pro- vide new and substantial tax advantages.The 529, with the upfront reduc-
tion, offers a higher return thanany existing investment option. The529 and ESA, while yielding thesame after-tax return as the traditional IRA,
substantially expand the assets thatcan be shielded from taxation. Finally,
because the 529 has no eligibilityrequirements, it provides the firstoppor-
tunity for tax-advantaged saving forthose families ineligible for theIRA or ESA because of their incomesor their access to a pension programat work.
4.3 Calculation of Returns Netof Income Taxes:
All Income Groups
In this section, I examine theadvantages of the educationsavings accounts for a range of householdincomes, ranging from the lowest
24 A key difference,however, is that much larger amountscan be deposited in a 529 than can be deposited in an ESA.Tax Policy and EducationPolicy99
federal tax bracket (householdincome of $35,000) to thehighest (house-
hold income of over$335,000). The groups and theirassociated state and
federal tax rates on earnedincome, capital gains, andinterest are shown
in Table 2.
First, I show how returns varyby income in thebenchmark, a non
advantaged account held inthe name of the parent. InFigure 2 and
Table 5, we see that the lowest-incomehousehold has the highest absolute
returns. This situationis due to this group'srelatively low tax rates on
two types of income.First, this group's lowermarginal tax rates on
earned income produce a largerdeposit for a given $1,000of pretax in-
come: they startwith $773 in principal,compared to $572 for the highest-
income family. Thisdifference in the upfronttaxation of income accounts
for most of the variation acrossincome groups in net returns.Second, the
lowest-income householdfaces the lowest marginal taxrates on capital
gains and interest. As aresult of these two aspectsof the tax code, the
highest-income household earns anafter-tax return of $728 on itspretax
savings of $1,000, whilethe lowest-incomehousehold earns 2.4 times as
much, or $1,735.
By eliminating someforms of taxation, thetax-advantaged vehicles
flatten this income gradientin after-tax returns. Figures3 and 4 show the
after-tax return on theESA and 529 for each income group.Figure 4 shows
the returns in dollar terms,while Figure 3 scales the returnsrelative to the

















FIGURE 2. After-Tax Return toNon-advantaged Account Held inName
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FIGURE 3. After-Tax Returnto College Saving Options (Relativeto
Nonadvantaged Account Held in Nameof Parent)
Notes: Assumes the portfolio mix of Table3, with stock returns of 9 percent and bondreturns of 4 percent. One-time investment of $1,000 of pretax incomewith all earnings reinvested. Fundsare drawn down over the final four years of the investment horizon.
DNon-aduanlaged a00000l
aUTMA
OSA, 00dilioesl ISA, 00529 (no drdoohon)
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FIGURE 4. After-Tax Returnto College Saving Options
Notes: Assumes the portfolio mix of Table 3,with stock returns of 9 percent and bondreturns of 4 percent. One-time investment of $1,000 of pretaxincome with all earnings reinvested. Fundsare drawn down over the final four years of the investment horizon.
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because their returnsfor the investment scenariolaid out earlier are iden-
tical, I have collapsed the ESA,529 without an upfrontdeduction, and the
traditional IRA into one category.Recall, however, that the contribution
limits are far higher forthe 529 than the ESA or IRA,making the 529 par-
ticularly advantageous to thosewho save above the ESA orIRA limits or
to those participatingin a retirement plan atwork and above the associ-
ated IRA income limits. Notealso that the top two income groupsdo not
qualify for the ESA but doqualify for the 529.
The largest increases in returnsaccrue to the highestincome group,
both in dollar terms (Figure4) and relative terms (Figure3). For those
in the top federal taxbracket, the 529 with an upfrontdeduction deliv-
ers a net returnalmost twice as high as that on anonadvantaged
account. The 529 without anupfront deduction and the ESAnet an
after-tax return 70 percenthigher than funds held in anonadvantaged
account. For those in thelowest bracket, the proportionalincreases are
much lower: the return on a529 with an upfront deductionis 26 per-
cent. The correspondingfigure is 17 percent for theESA and 529 with
no upfrontdeduction. Note that the UTMAis of almost no benefitfor
this lowest-incomehousehold because the childand parent are in the
same low taxbracket.
These calculations makeclear that both the relativeand absolute
advantages of the educationsavings accounts rise steeplywith income. At
the bottom of the incomedistribution, where marginal tax rates arethe
lowest, the new accountsoffer after-tax returns 17 to 26percent higher
than returns on anonadvantaged account. For aninitial pretax invest-
ment of $1,000, thistranslates into an additional returnof $291 to $453. At
the top of the incomedistribution, the new accountsoffer after-tax returns
70 to 91 percent higherthan returns on a nonadvantagedaccount. For an
initial pretax investment of$1,000, this translates into anadditional return
of $511 to $663.
5. THE TREATMENTOF ASSETS BY THE
FINANCIAL AID SYSTEM
This section turns to thefinancial aid system. First, I discussin general
terms the aspectsof aid determination that affect netreturns to savings.
Next, I calculate the impactof the aid system's treatmentof assets on
returns to various savingsvehicles.
5.1 Overview of theFinancial Aid Determination Process
The federal governmentdistributes need-based aidaccording to a
formula called thefederal methodology, whichI describe in this102Dynarski
section.25 Most schoolsuse the same formula when distributing theirown
need-based aid. Eighty-sevenpercent of four-year public schools and57
percent of four-year private schoolsuse the federal methodology to dis-
tribute need-based institutional grants.26The financial aid determination
process I describe here is used for dependentstudents in academicyear
2002_2003.27
Families applying for aid fillout the Free Application for FederalStu- dent Aid (FAFSA), which collectsdetailed informationon family income,
assets, and expenses. A new FAFSA,with current data, must be filled
out previous to every academicyear for which a student wants aid. Finan-
cial data from the FAFSA is put throughan algorithm that calculates the
expected contribution of the familyand of the student toward schooling
costs. If the sum of the expectedcontributions from the family andstu- dent is less than anticipated schoolingcosts, the student is eligible for aid.
In the calculation of theexpected contribution, savingsare "taxed"
because both assets and asset incomeare considered resources for paying
for college.
The resources of the family and thestudent are calculated separately
and are assessed at differingrates in the determination of aid. In thecal- culation of the family's contribution,an algorithm sums parental income
from all sources. Asset income,in the form of dividends, interest,and cap-
ital gains, is included.28 Inparticular, the earnings portion ofwithdrawal from some asset accounts iscounted as income by the aid formula.After
summing income, the aid algorithmsubtracts allowableexpenses, includ-
ing taxes, an allowance basedon family size, tuition paid for primary and
secondary school, and unusually highmedical costs.
To this net income figure is added12 percent of certain familyassets.29
From the perspective of the financialaid system, assets fall into three
categories. A first class of assets, notablyhome equity, pensions, and other
25The aid determination process is describedin detail by the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation (2002, 2003) in annual releases of TheStudent Financial Aid Handbook. The2002-2003 version used in this paper was downloadedfrom http://ifap.ed.gov/I&ywebApp/
currentSFAHandbooksPag.jsp on October 17, 2003.
26See National Association of StudentFinancial Aid Administrators and theCollege Board (2002).
27In the past, students gamed their dependencystatus because, for an independent student,
family income is not counted in the needdetermination process. Today, almost all college- age students are considered dependents because rulechanges have made it muchmore dif- ficult for young people to declare themselvesindependent.
28J discuss below changes the idea for whichtypes of assets this source of income is counted and not counted.
29If a family is not required to filea 1040 and has an adjusted gross income (AGI) below
$50,000, then no assets are added at thispoint.Tax Policy and Education Policy103
retirement vehicles, is completelysheltered from consideration by the aid
formula. These assets are notconsidered available for college expenses.
A second class of assets, including529 savings accounts and ESAs, is con-
sidered fully available for college expenses.The first dollar of these assets
is assessed in the determinationof aid. A final class consists of any assets
that do not fall into these first twocategories. These assets are partially
sheltered from consideration by an assetprotection allowance. Each fam-
ily is allowed a certain level of savings,based on the age of the oldest par-
ent; the assumption is thatolder parents need a higher levelof savings
for their approaching retirement.Below this allowance, assets in thisclass
are assumed to beunavailable for schooling costs. The highestallowance
is $70,000; for a family inwhich the oldest parent is 50, theallowance is
$44,000. Above the allowance, 12 percentof assets is added to the net
income figure.
The resulting weighted sum of income, expenses,and assets is the fam-
ily's adjusted available income(AAI). A progressive schedule, with rates
ranging from 22 percent to 47 percent,is applied to AAI to determinethe
expected family contribution(EFC).3° The schedule is quite steep: anAAI
of $11,000 is marginally assessed at22 percent, while the schedule tops
out at an AAI of $24,000,which is marginally assessed at 47 percent.In the
calculations below, I assume that families areat the top of this schedule.
The expected contribution of thestudent is calculated analogously to
the process just described,with fewer protections for income and assets.
All student income above $1,750 isassumed to be available for college
and is assessed at a rate of 50percent. There is no asset protection
allowance for students. Foreach year of college, students areexpected to
contribute 35 percent of their assets.
5.2 The Treatment of Assetsand Asset Income in the Aid
Determination Process
Assets returns are affected twicein the process just described because
both asset balances and asset income areconsidered available for college
expenses. First, I willdescribe the treatment of an asset balance.Consider
an enteringfreshman whose parents have $45,000 infinancial assets that
are not held in retirementaccounts or college savings plans.These assets
fall into the third category describedabove and so are partially sheltered
by the asset protection allowance.Assuming the older parent is 50,
$44,000 is protected from considerationby the aid formula and $1,000 is
subject to assessment. Twelve percentof the $1,000 is added to adjusted
30 Families who are not required to file a 1040 and whose incomesare below $13,000 are
automatically assigned an EFC of zero.104Dynarski
available income, which is then assessedat 47 percent. Thus, 5.64 (0.12 x
0.47) percent of the $1,000 is considered availablefor the first year of col-
lege. Freshman-year financial aid is reducedby $56.40 as a result of this
aspect of the aid formula.
If the child goes on for anotheryear of college and applies again for aid,
sophomore-year financial aid is again reducedby 5.64 percent of the
remaining asset balance. As a result, the totalimpact of this $1,000 asset
on aid received throughout college is a function of the annualassessment
on the asset balance(ta,5.64 percent, in this case) and the numberof years
spent in college. If a family draws downan equal share of the initial asset
balance for each year of college (and for simplicity,we assume no asset
earnings once the child enters college),we can summarize the reduction
in aid received over the collegecareer as a result of owning a dollar in
assets as of the senior year of high schoolas follows:
T
ta =
Here,tindexes each year of college for whichaid is requested, T is the
total number years of college for which aidis requested; a indexes differ-
ent types of assets. Assume that the high schoolsenior we are considering
ends up spending four years in college, drawingdown equal increments
of the asset per year forexpenses. For this family, each dollar of assets
held as of the senior year leads toa reduction in aid over the four years of
college of 14.1 cents:
Ta ta=0.0564 = 0.141
or 14.1 percent. Note that this result does not show thefull impact of the
asset on aid because we have not allowed theasset to grow while the child
is in college, which produces income thatgoes into the aid formula, nor
have we considered thatsome portion of the withdrawals may consist of
earnings, which again produces income thatgoes into the aid formula.
I will consider both of these issues belowand in the main calculations of
the paper.
I have just described the financial aidsystem's treatment of a parental
asset. Some savings are considered assets of the childin the calculation of
aid eligibility which changes the annualassessment rate from 5.64 to 35
percent. The second column of Table 6 shows theannual assessment on
asset balances for the savings vehicleswe have been considering through-
out the paper. Balances in a 529 savings planare treated as an asset of the
parent in the determination of the aid taxon asset balances. Balances in
retirement vehicles are ignored by the aid formula.An ESA is consideredTABLE 6


















by the financial aid systemto be owned by thepotential student, as is an
UTMA or any other assetin the child's name.31For such assets, therele-
vant annual assessment onasset balances is 35percent rather than 5.64
percent. The first dollarof such assets is assessed atthis rate because there
is no asset protectionallowance for the student.Over four years of col-
lege, the assessment onthese asset balances amountsto 87.5 percent:
-
ta =0.350.875
As the table and thesecalculations make clear, theaid tax on asset bal-
ances varieswidely across savings vehicles.
Next, I describe theaid system's treatmentof asset earnings. Likeall
other sources of income,asset income isconsidered a financial resource
that a family can applytoward college costs, and soincreases in asset
31 Department of Education documents forthe 2003-2004 school yearclearly state that the
ESA is to be treated as an assetof the child, which isassessed at the 35 percent rate:"The
Education IRA is counted as anasset of the beneficiary,"and "Education IRAs have been
appropriately renamed educationsavings accounts; they areconsidered an investment
asset for the studentbeneficiary (pp. AVG-20 andAVG-19, respectively, in The Student
Financial Aid Handbook 2003-2004).This document can be accessedat http:/ /ifap.ed.gov/
sfahandbooks/attach ents/0304AVGMastff. This same information iscontained in
the dozens of financialadvising documents, news articles,and financial aid resources for
parents, schools, and aidprofessionals that I have consulted. It isalso contained in the instruc-
tions for completing theonline FAFSA. As of November2003, it appears that the
Department of Education is movingto improve the treatmentof the ESA documented in this
paper. The departmenthas now posted revisions tothe online version of the StudentFinancial
Aid Handbook, its referencemanual of aid rules. These revisionsindicate that, in the future,
the ESA will be given thetreatment currently applied tothe 529 savings plans. Thiswill
eliminate the aid tax of over100 percent that is currentlyapplied to the ESA. See additional
discussion of implementationof this policy shift in the introductionto this paper.







47 47% of realized earnings
net of income tax
0 47% of withdrawal net
of income tax
o None
0 50% of realized earnings
50 50% of realized earnings
net of income tax106Dynarski
income lead to decreasesin aid. Asset income isconsidered only if it is realized during ayear when income is considered in thedetermination of aid. Asset income isassessed with a one-year lag becauseit is based on income reported on theprevious year's 1040. Freshman-yearaid, for example, is based on the FAFSAfiled when the studentwas a high school senior. This FAFSA containstax return data on asset incomefor the calen- dar year that spans thespring of the junior year and fallof the senior year of high school. Any earningsreceived during that periodcount as income
in the determination of financialaid for freshmanyear. These earnings might take the form of interest,dividends, or capital gainsrealizations stemming from the sale of stockor liquidation of a mutual fund.
Note that in any account thathas been building valuefor 18 years, a substantial portion of thebalance consists of unrealizedgains. As the account is drawn down for college,these earningsare realized and assessed by the aid formula. Ina nonadvantaged account, giventhe investment scenario assumedthroughout the paper, unrealizedgains represent about 55 percent ofaccount value. When withdrawalsare made to pay for college, 55percent of each withdrawal istreated as income.
Any income taxes paid ina given year offset the income taxedby the financial aid formula. Forexample, interest earned ina nonadvantageci account is taxed by the state and federalgovernments. Interest adds to
adjusted available income, andtaxes paid on the interest subtractfrom it. The financial aid system thereforeassesses asset income net ofany income taxes paid on that income.
The last two columns ofTable 6 show theassessment rate on asset earnings for the different savingsvehicles. I show separatelythe treat- ment of earnings accruals andof withdrawals. For the529 and ESA, earnings are ignored by the aidsystem as they accrue; theseearnings do not appear on the FAFSA.The earnings portion ofwithdrawals from the 529 is also ignored by theaid system. However, theearnings por- tion of withdrawals from theESA are assessed at 50 percent.32For the traditional IRA, earningsare ignored by the aid systemas they accrue, and the entirety ofany withdrawal is treated as incomeand is assessed at the parents' rate of 47percent. However, any incometaxes paid on these withdrawals reduce theamount of income thatgoes into the aid formula.33
32 Seepage AVG-17 of U.S. Department of Education(2003).
n Personalcomniw'ticatjon with Anthony Jones, U.S.Department of Education. See also Chapter 6 of the 2003-2004 FederalStudent Aid Handbook, whichcontains the worksheets detailing the treatment of variousassets and income.Tax Policy and EducationPolicy107
5.3 Returns Netof Income Taxesand Aid Reductions
Table 7 shows howreductions in aidaffect after-tax returnsfor various
savings vehicles. Thefirst column showsthe returns on a givensavings
vehicle for a householdthat is unaffected byaid policy; we have seen
these returns in earliertables. As discussed earlier,asset returns areunaf-
fected by aid policy fortwo types offamilies. The first type isextremely
needy (with very lowfinancial resourcesand/or very high schooling
costs) and receiving themaximum aid allowed.The second type of fam-
ily is not at all needy(with very high financial resourcesand/or very low
schooling costs) andreceiving zero aid. Forneither family does a mar-
ginal change in assetsaffect aid.
The second columnof Table 7 shows returnsnet of reductions infinan-
cial aid induced byasset holdings. I assume, asI have throughoutthe
paper, that theaccount funds are drawndown over the four yearsof col-
lege. These results arenot shown for the toptwo tax brackets,in which
I assume householdincome is sufficientlyhigh (above $150,000)that the
child is beyond themargin of eligibilityof financial aid at eventhe most
expensive institutions.Columns (3) and (4) expressthe loss in aid as a per-
centage of the assetbalance at the startof college and as a percentageof
the after-tax return,respectively.
The impact on returnsis enormous,especially for the UTMAand ESA,
for which returns arenegative once losses inaid are considered.Each of
these assets isconsidered by thefinancial aid system tobelong to the
child. As a result, theannual assessment on assetbalances held in eitherof
these vehicles is 35percent rather than the5.64 percent applied tothe
other savings vehicles.When we consider onlyincome taxes, an aid-
marginal family withtaxable income of $50,000who puts $1,000 pretaxin
an ESA nets areturn of $1,808.This return is 22 percenthigher than if the
funds were invested in anonadvantaged account (seeTable 4). But once
we considerlosses of need-basedaid, the financial advantageof the ESA
disappears. Thefinal return on the$1,000 pretax investment,net of
income and aid taxes,is $1,194. Thisfamily loses all principaland all
earnings, plus anadditional $194, to income taxesand foregone aid. The
aid lost due to owningassets in the ESA,expressed as a percentageof the
return net of incometax, ranges from160 percent for thefamily with
$35,000 of income to172 percent for thefamily with $100,000 ofincome.
A similar storyholds for the UTMA,with the reduction in returnsrang-
ing from 178 to194 percent.
As already noted, totalaid is capped by a student'sactual schooling costs, whichincludes
tuition and fees plus anallowance for items such asfood, rent, and other living expenses.108Dynarski
TABLE 7
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Because this result is soextraordinary, I will lay out indetail the losses
in aid associatedwith holding funds in an ESA.Table 8 shows the cal-
culation in detail for theESA, for a 529 without anupfront deduction,
and for an UTMA. As anexample, I examine a familywith $100,000 in
income.35 In January of year 18,when the child is a highschool senior, this
family files a financial aid form.At this time the ESA account,which has
been gaining value sinceit was established at year 0with an after-tax con-
tribution of $673, contains$2,314; this balance is shownin column (1) of
Table 8. Thirty-five percentof this balance, or $810, isconsidered available
for college costs; this isshown in column (2). Atthe end of the year, when
the child is a freshmanin college, the familydraws down $609, one-
quarter of the end-of-yearbalance [column (4)]. Seventy-onepercent of
this amount ($432) consistsof earnings, which is consideredincome of the
child in the calculation ofaid and is assessed at 50 percent.Aid is there-
fore reduced by $216because of this withdrawal.
The remaining rows repeatthese calculations for the threesubsequent
years until the accountis emptied. Asset balances areassessed four times,
once for eachFAFSA that is filed. Withdrawals areassessed just three
times because incomeis recorded on the FAFSAwith a one-year lag, and
so the final,senior-year withdrawal doesnot appear on a filedFAFSA.
The total reduction in aidis $2,816, while the balanceat the start of year
18 was $2,314. The ratioof these two numbers is the122 percent shown in
Table 7.
Family income does not affect theaid process depicted in Table 8, but itis necessary to
choose an income tax bracket to pindown the dollar amounts showntherein.110Dynarski
TABLE 8
Detailed Aid Calculations: Lossin Aid for Family
Holding Various Assets
Coverdell ESA




Balance,5.64% ofBalance, Loss of aid start ofstart-of-year end Withdrawal,due to asset Total loss year balance of yearend of yearincome, none of aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 18$2,314 $130 $2,435 $609
Year 19$1,826 $103 $1,922 $641
Year 20$1,282$ 72 $1,349 $674 Year2l$ 674$38 $ 710 $710
Total $343 $ $343 As share of year 18 starting balance:15%
UTMA
Loss of aid Loss of aid
due to asset due to asset
balance, income, 50%
Balance,35% of Balance, of after-tax start ofstart-of-year end Withdrawal, realized Total loss year balance of yearend of year earnings of aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)























of aid (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 18$2,314$ 810 $2,435 $609 $216 Year 19$1,826$ 639 $1,922 $641 $227 Year 20$1,282$ 449 $1,349 $674 $239 Year2l$ 674$ 236 $ 710 $710 Total $2,134
As share of year 18 starting balance:122%
$682 $2,816$ 440 $1,320 $660 $241






As share of year18
Notes: Unrealized earnings accountfor 68-71% of withdrawals. Familyhas household income of
$100,000.
The 529 savings plans are not ashard hit by the aid tax becausethe
financial aid system considers thisasset as belonging to the parentrather
than to the child. The aid tax onnet of income tax returnsfor the 529 is 57
to 63 percent, lowerthan that on a nonadvantagedaccount in the name of
the parent (63 percent to81 percent). Once we consideraid taxes, the 529,
with or without an upfrontdeduction, nets higher returnsthan the non-
advantaged account, the UTMA, orthe ESA. In the case of thenonadvan-
taged account, the 529performs better because itsinside buildup is not
taxed by the financial aid system.In the case of the UTMAand ESA, the
529 performs better becausethe tax on the asset balance is5.64 percent
rather than 35 percent.
6. DISCUSSION
The intent of the savingsincentives is to increase savingby increasing
net returns. The intentof the financial aid system is togive less aid to
those with higher incomeand assets. These two setsof policies
inevitably work at cross-purposesbecause the aid system attemptsto
tax away any increasein assets and income thatthe savings incentives
create. Unless assetsand asset income arecompletely disregarded, asset
returns for aid-marginalfamilies are reduced by the aiddetermination
process. Given thisconstraint, we can make theaid tax as non-arbitrary
as possible. Here,I discuss the results ofthe paper's analysis in the con-
text of this goal.






























6.1 Asset "Taxes" Greater Than100 Percent
It is difficult to inferany reasonable policy goal that is consistent withthe aid system's current treatmentof the Coverdell, the UTMA, and allassets held in the name of the student.Families that put funds in thesevehicles
lose all their assets to incometaxes and aid reductions; that is, thesevehi-
cles face income taxes and "aidtaxes" that sum to wellover 100 percent.
The paper's simulations showthat a middle-income family whoputs
$1,000 into a Coverdell loses all ofthe principal and earnings, plusan addi-
tional $194, to income and aidtaxes. A family that puts funds intothe
name of the student in an UTMA iseven worse off, losing principal and
earnings plus an additional$391.Any asset held in thename of the child
faces similar treatment.
Fully taxing away principal andearningsa tax of 100 percentiscon- sistent with a very strict,narrow formulation of need: at the time ofcol- lege attendance, it putsa saving family in the same position vis-à-visthe aid system as a nonsaving family.36However, taxing awaymore than prin-
cipal and earnings is certainlynot consistent with this strict formulation
of need because it places the savingfamily in a worse-off positionthan the
nonsaving familyby thousands of dollarsif they save at the raterecom-
mended by financial counselors.
6.2 Sharply Differing Tax Rateson Parents' and Students'
Assets
The differing treatment ofassets held by the parent and the studenthas a
large impact on aid received andnet returns, as shown in Figure 5.This
operates counter to the aid system's goalof treating equally families with
equal resources because two familieswith the same asset levels face vastly
divergent tax rates dependingon whose name is on the account. A
middle-income family (income of $50,000)who puts funds in the child's
name in an UTMA yields a small incometax advantage_a9percent
increase in the lifetime return (notannualized return), as shown in Table4. For a family who deposits $1,000of pretax income inan account and
leaves it to accrue for 18years, this translates into a savings of$133.
However, the associated loss in aidmore than erases this small gain from
gaming the income tax system. Oncewe consider both the income tax and
losses in aid, this family loses $1,881by having the funds inan UTMA
rather than in the parent'sname [netting a return of$1,391versus$490,
see colunm (2) of Table 7]. They also endup with far less than they would
36The saving family has forgone consumptionto save, and so it is worse off ina lifetime sense than if it had not saved at all when principal andearnings are fully taxed away. Edlin
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FIGURE 5. Return toCollege Saving Options, Netof Aid Lost and
Income Tax
Notes: Assumes those in the bottomfour brackets are on the aid margin Theassumed aid tax is zero in the top two
brackets-
have had they notsaved at all, having lost theirprincipal, their earnings,
and an additional $391.The first dollar of fundsheld in the child's name
results in aid reductions,while assets held in theparents' name are pro-
tected by an asset allowance.As a result, the averageaid tax rate on the
parents' assets is well belowthat on children's assets.
6.3 Sharply DifferingTax Rates on DifferentSavings
Vehicles
As Table 7 makes clear,the impact of aid policy onasset returns varies
wildly, depending on thesavings vehicle. A dollar inassets held by the
family of a high school seniorproduces1 over a four-yearcollege career, a
reduction in need-basedaid of $0.15 if the funds areheld in a 529 savings
plan, $0.26 to $0.39 if thefunds are held in an IRA,about $0.40 if they are
held in a typical mutualfund account in the parent's name,$1.22 if they
are held in aCoverdell ESA, and $1.24 if they areheld in an UTMA. We
can express theseaid reductions relative toafter-tax returns on these
various savings vehicles.The reduction in aid causedby holding funds in
a given vehicle rangesfrom 19 percent of after-taxreturns for the 529 to
200 percent for the UTMA.114Dynarski
As discussed above, in thecontext of asset ownership byparents and children, such wildly varyingtreatment of assets does not advancethe goals of the need-based aidsystem. It induces an efficiency lossbecause it
encourages shifting of assets toward thosevehicles that are treated pref-
erentially by the aid system. Andit induces a loss in equitybecause it imposes significant losseson those who do not know how togame the system. This leads to a loss of horizontalequity because the aidsystem
treats unequally those who have thesame asset levels but have made dif-
fering strategic choices aboutwhere to put the funds.
6.4 Policy Alternatives
Two key points emerge from thisdiscussion. First, some assetsare treated
extremely punitively by the aidsystem, resulting in those whosave los-
ing more than one dollar in aid foreach dollar they hold inassets. A sec-
ond and distinct point is thatthe treatment of assets is highlyinconsistent. I have already explained theefficiency and equity losses inducedby these aspects of the aid system. Here I layout and critique several policy
options that address these twopoints.
There are two mainsources of the variable treatment ofassets by the aid
system: the differential treatment ofparents' and children's assets and the
differential treatment of differentasset typese.g., retirementaccounts, home equity college savingsplans, and nonadvantagedaccounts. The
differential treatment of parents'and children's assetsaccounts for most of the variance in thetreatment of assets; for example,because the Coverdeli is defined asan asset of the child, it facesan annual assessment
rate on asset balances of 35percent rather than the 5.64percent imposed
on the 529 savings plans, which are definedas an asset of the parent. Were
the Coverdell instead definedas an asset of the parent, $1.00 heldin a Coverdell would lead toa reduction in aid of $0.15, thesame as the 529
savings plan, rather than $1.22. Thefact that the first dollar ofchildren's assets is assessed whilemany parental assets are protected byan allowance that goes as highas $70,000 also contributes to the divergence
in the treatment of parents' andchildren's assets.37
Pooling parents' and children'sassets in aid determination will there-
fore go far in reducing thevariability in the treatment ofassets. All children's assets, and not justthose of the student applicant,would be included in this pool. Applyingwhat is currently thetreatment of parents' assets to children'sassets is the simplest solution, butthis approach would obviously leadto a higher level of aidexpenditures
The paper's calculations use marginaltax rates rather, so than averagerates, so they ignore this aspect of the divergence in thetreatment of parents' and children'sassets.Tax Policy and EducationPolicy115
because children's assetswould be assessed at amuch lower rate. A
revenue-neutral alternativewould be a new assessmentrate on the
pooled assets that is theasset-weighted average of the currentassessment
rates. Note thatthis pooling of assetswould bring children's assetsunder
what is currently theparents' asset protection allowance.
The second issue is howdifferent types of assets aretreated. Currently,
the value of retirementassets and home equity arecompletely excluded
from aid determination.38All other assets contribute tothe net worth con-
sidered available for collegecosts. An alternative is topool all assets
regular accounts,Coverdells, 529s, UTMAs, retirementassets, home
equityand tax them uniformiyin the aid determination process.Under
such a system, the aid taxrate on assets would bethe same across savings
vehicles. Unifying assets inthis way would reduce thedeadweight loss
caused by families shiftingassets to avoid theaid tax. It would also elim-
inate several sourcesof horizontal inequity. Forexample, homeowners in
areas with highreal estate values (the Eastand West coasts) have greater
opportunity to shield assetsfrom the aid system thando renters or those
in areas with lowerreal estate values (themiddle of the country).
Similarly, those who work injobs that provide access to a401(k) plan have
a greaterability to shield assets thando other workers.
If other aspects of theaid determination process wereunchanged, the
main effect of poolingall types of assets wouldbe to decrease aid because
it would add retirementassets and home equity tothe net worth consid-
ered available for payingfor college. To maintainthe current level of aid
spending, the assessment rate onall assets could be reducedbelow its
current maximumof 5.64 percent.Alternatively, the asset protection
allowances could beincreased so that the total networth assessed by the
aid system remainsunchanged.
7. Conclusion
This paper hasexamined the income tax code'smost recent experimenta-
tion with educationpolicy, in the form of theCoverdell Education Savings
Account and the 529savings plans. Tax incentivesfor college saving were
designed to increase savingsby increasing after-tax returns.From the nar-
row perspectiveof the income tax code,they have succeeded in increas-
ing after-tax returns.But if we broaden ourperspective to include the
interaction of the new taxincentives with existingeducational policyin
the form of thefinancial aid systemthesepolicies fail. Families who
save for college arepotentially subject to taxation notonly by federal and
After-tax withdrawals fromretirement funds are treated asavailable income, however.116Dynarski
state taxing authorities but also bythe federal, state, and collegefinancial aid systems. As I have shown,the aid tax on savingscan extend well up
the income distribution becausefairly well-off familiescan qualify for aid at expensive private rnstitutions.
For families caught in thecross fire between aid policy andtax policy, the impact on the bottom lineis not pretty A family that heedsadvice to save for college in one of the new collegesavings vehicles can find itself
far worse off than if it hadsimply placed funds ina non-advantaged account in the parents'name. Further, those who put funds ina Coverdell
can find themselves worse off than if theyhad not saved at all. Theseper- verse outcomes indicate that greaterattention to the interaction of aidand taxes is required if the tax codeis to succeed as an instrumentfor educa- tion policy.
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